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As a consequence, public debt exploded, causing the euro 
crisis. This currency crisis cannot be overcome by ever new 
rescue packages in favor of banks, funds and large estates, 
the bill being borne by the general public in terms of cutback 
packages. These measures only weaken economic activity, 
as can be observed in Greece. The financial markets have to 
be controlled again. The burden of debt has to be bearable. 
Therefore a transparently and fairly negotiated and perceived 
part of the creditor’s claims and the debt have to be canceled. 
Financial transactions, which were dissociated from the real 
economy in the frenzy of speculation, have to be taxed, just 
as large estates and high incomes.
Even conservative politicians deplore that the European in-
tegration project is threatened. The European societies are 
collapsing, one after the other is thrown into chaos by the 
failing financial markets. Some of the biggest speculators 
realized that they have gone too far. Now the political class is 
called upon to stop the destructive dynamic of the financial 
crisis by political measures that won’t worsen the situation. 
This is a distress call. Greece cannot «economize» any more 
or squeeze a higher debt service capacity out of the popula-
tion without forsaking itself. Thus the «emergency exit» has to 
be on the financial market’s side. The markets and their sup-
porters have failed to obstruct this exit so far. The only feasible 
action is to cut the debt and to reduce the creditor’s claims. 
Preliminary remark: On the character 
Of this argumentarium
Subsequently, several arguments are compiled to an «ar-
gumentarium» to make this distress call audible and com-
prehensible. An argumentarium is not a program, nor is it a 
catalog of measures for crisis management. It collects argu-
ments to address the cause and development, the dramatic 
escalations and the dead ends and possible ways out of the 
current crisis, without claiming to be complete. It is necessary 
reasOn and intentiOn: a distress call
The financial crisis is the escalation of the «financial insta-
bilities» that are unavoidable in capitalist societies. To avoid 
financial losses for the financial institutions, since politicians 
are afraid of not being able to deal with the consequences 
(«too big to fail»), gigantic bailout packages are hammered 
out, to be paid by the European taxpayers. The always just 
short-term stabilization of the financial markets is carried out 
through a frontal attack on incomes and jobs, social com-
forts and public goods, as well as the people’s democratic 
participation rights. To rescue the financial institutions, the 
destruction of the social cohesion, the loss of income and 
jobs and the impoverishment of broad levels of the popula-
tion on the richest continent on earth is deliberately accepted, 
the future prospects of a whole generation, their hopes and 
expectations are destroyed.
We cannot put up with this blind destruction carried out by the 
saviors of the financial system. Neither in Greece today, nor 
in Portugal, Ireland, Italy or Spain tomorrow, or in France and 
Germany the day after tomorrow. The disembedded and un-
leashed financial markets and their players have to be civilized, 
controlled and strictly regulated. Elected governments buckle 
before rating agencies that are not legitimized by anybody – 
except by those governments themselves. The European Un-
ion, the European Central Bank, the IMF and the governments 
only have one item on their agendas: the reestablishment of 
the debt service capacity of the heavily indebted countries by 
means of a blood and tears austerity. The people in the debtor 
countries have to pay for the breakdown of the markets. They 
have to pay for the liberalization and deregulation that was 
conducted over the last 30 years all over the world. Private 
losses are compensated by public coffers, in Germany as well 
as in the USA, in Iceland or in Greece. To this end, loans are 
taken out at those financial institutions that have just been 
saved and whom thus are guaranteed secure profits.
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2for the political work to at least adumbrate the most important 
development trends. It is a way to position the Greek crisis 
(which is already interpreted as a tragedy) in the bigger his-
torical context of the global economic crisis. An attempt like 
this is also called a «roadmapping» of the progression of the 
crisis. The roadmap will have to be specified, improved and 
will certainly also be depicted controversially, depending on 
the difference in theoretical assessment and political orienta-
tion. There is more than one way to perceive the genesis, the 
causes, the consequences, the possible courses of action 
and the solutions. 
At Attac’s European networking academy in August 2011 
in Freiburg, people from different European countries sug-
gested that the scientific advisory boards formulate a propo-
sition for managing the crisis. The release of this proposal is 
planned for autumn 2011. At the same time it was agreed 
upon to work on the «Manifest concerning the euro crisis – 
The debt crisis of the nations can only be overcome by a 
fundamental reform of the global financial system and the 
EU»1, which was submitted by the academic advisory board 
of Attac Germany in spring 2011. This is essential, since the 
public debate is going in a wrong direction and is reaching 
dangerous terrain. The debtor countries, particularly Greece, 
are made out as the villains, not the markets or the govern-
ments, who, with their policies of liberalization and deregula-
tion, are responsible for the market’s modus operandi and the 
thereby triggered catastrophe. 
The presented argumentarium is in so far incomplete as the 
correlation between economic, financial and currency crisis 
and energy, climate and food crisis, in other words the all-
encompassing and systemic character of this overall crisis, is 
not sufficiently highlighted. On the other hand, an argumen-
tarium neither is nor should be an extensive historical work 
about the crisis of the century, nor a theory of the big social 
transformation over the course of this crisis.
1st argument: The crisis has expanded from a private 
mortgage crisis to an international banking crisis – but 
that was only the beginning of a way more dangerous 
dynamic.
Virtually all observers stress that this crisis is the most serious 
one of the last eighty years. But even that is an understate-
ment. It is the most serious crisis in the history of capitalist 
economy: Not only are the financial losses horrendous and 
the economic downturn catastrophic; to get over the finan-
cial and economic crisis, the energy regime, which has been 
predominant since the industrial revolution in the second half 
of the 18th century, has to be resolved. The fossil fuels are 
nearly used up and the climate change is reaching critical 
levels which demand a renunciation of the usage of fossil 
fuels. Furthermore, the Fukushima disaster has made it clear 
that nuclear energy cannot be an alternative. 
The current crisis started unspectacularly in the US real 
estate sector in 2007/2008 as a «subprime» crisis of non-
creditworthy mortgage debtors. But it were the banks and 
funds that had tricked them into mortgage loans so large 
that the property owners crumbled under the weight of the 
payments when the real economy went into recession, de-
stroying their jobs (and incomes). The credit-financed boom 
came to an end and many homeowners found themselves 
homeless on the street. The generously distributed loans 
became non-performing and the complex security papers, 
composed of consumer loans, overdraft credits, student and 
car loans, turned out to be toxic. The banks that had formerly 
advertised them as innovative investments had to quickly 
remove them to avoid bankruptcy. 
The collateralized debts obligations (CDO) were included into 
the portfolios of banks and funds on a global scale because 
they were expected to yield high returns in resale. The invest-
ment divisions of all big banks were expanded and securities 
dealers did good business. The CDO business seemed to be 
reliable, because the rating agencies awarded those papers 
top marks and the dealings in securities and credits were en-
sured through credit default swaps (CDS). This was enabled 
by the liberalization and deregulation of the financial markets 
and the attitude of the bank managers, who, expecting high 
returns, extensively took advantage of the new liberties on 
the global financial markets. A credit bubble of global mag-
nitude arose. After the bubble burst, the owners couldn’t 
dispose of their papers anymore or had to accept substantial 
losses. 
Why did the bubble have to burst? Because the real economy, 
and with it the incomes and profits, didn’t increase propor-
tionally to the escalating interest claims. Liabilities couldn’t 
be duly serviced; the crash was there – abundantly. 
The national subprime crisis escalated to an international 
banking crisis that dragged a lot of financial institutions, now 
also European ones, into bankruptcy. The greed for fast and 
high profits had overridden any caution and all rules of pro-
priety. As a result of the deregulation of the financial industry 
in the previous decades, financial innovations had prepared 
the ground for the huge growth of the financial markets: The 
financial institutions had grown too big to fail – their crash 
would drag the whole system with them. The bank managers 
raked in double-digit returns with complex financial instru-
ments and cashed out obscenely huge salaries and bonuses, 
which were even beyond their own imagination, to them-
selves and their people. Economists hired themselves out 
as jesters who didn’t even dare telling their employers the 
truth – afraid of biting the hand that fed them huge fees. A 
lot of Ivy League economy experts in the US didn’t even dis-
cern the truth, being blinded by the doctrine of the neoliberal 
mainstream.
They only knew one thing: the banks, funds and insurances 
mustn’t go bankrupt. It was fine to let the little mortgage 
debtors, the uninfluential so-called NINJAs («no income, 
no job or assets») go broke, but not the systemically impor-
tant big banks, funds or investment houses. Because of the 
uncontrollable consequences, a system collapse had to be 
avoided at all costs. For this purpose, the financial establish-
ments had already organized an efficient lobby and a network 
of politicians, science and media people. To steer political 
decisions in the desired direction, they even temporarily 
gave up their favorite dogma of the efficient markets and 
the bureaucratic monster state. The monster had to rush to 
help. This was not a return to Keynesian state intervention – 
contrary to the belief of many critical observers. In fact, the 
financial institutions commissioned the state. Even though 
they applauded the debt brake, they didn’t have any qualms 
1 «Manifest zur Krise des Euro – Die Schuldenkrise der Staaten kann nur durch grundle-
gende Reformen des globalen Finanzsystems und der EU überwunden werden»
3to benefit from the state’s tax monopoly by taking hundreds 
of billions of euros and dollars as rescue packages, which 
have to be ponied up by the taxpayers. Without the state’s 
intervention, the redistribution from the bottom to the top 
wouldn’t have been as efficient.
2nd argument: The financial crisis of private bankrupts 
becomes a debt crisis of sovereign states, threatening to 
result in a global hegemony crisis, which also raises the 
question of war and peace.
Welfare redistribution has always been targeted by the fi-
nancial institutions as inefficient and ultimately antisocial 
because it burdens the high achievers. The capitalist redistri-
bution from the people drawing salaries and transfer incomes 
to the class of the high asset holders was, on the other hand, 
justified as being without alternative. TINA («there is no al-
ternative») is not just neoliberal ideology, but also a formula 
to inspire a neoliberal policy. Years of deregulation and big 
profits financed the hypertrophic growth of the financial in-
stitutions, ultimately making them too big to fail. The govern-
ments submitted to the practical constraints that they had 
assisted in originating. Within a very short time, thousands 
of millions of euros and dollars of funds were raised, not from 
the private pockets that had drawn in the high profits, bo-
nuses and royalties, but from public sources. The ruling elite 
helped themselves to the public finances as if democratic 
rules, laws, administrative regulations, even the constitution 
or political discourses, in which traditions, experiences and 
cultural ties are condensed, didn’t concern them. They didn’t 
have any reservations about inflating national finances over 
all limits (which they – in Europe with the Maastricht criteria – 
had established themselves) to rescue the private banks and 
funds and the large private assets invested there. They didn’t 
have any qualms about sacrificing social cohesion in favor of 
return expectations of investors. The thereby rescued large 
fortunes have been largely accumulated during the last two 
or three decades with tax cuts for the rich and the deregula-
tion of the financial markets. Conservative, social democratic, 
liberal and green governments all over Europe have equally 
contributed to this policy. They have continued this policy 
of capital accumulation for the rich and plundering of the 
lower and middle classes, carrying on, even intensifying this 
redistribution from the bottom to the top during the economic 
crisis. The intensification was grounded in the crisis mecha-
nisms at first: unemployment, loss of income, degradation, 
and then continued in the crisis management with the cruel 
austerity policy.
The extremely expensive bank bailout (which will probably 
sum up to thousands of millions of euros and will be further 
increased by the costs of rescuing the industry and by the tax 
deficit due to mass unemployment), paid by public funds, 
transformed the financial crisis of private assets into a fis-
cal crisis of sovereign states. Nobody was asked for permis-
sion, least of all the citizens in their capacity as taxpayers. It 
was unavoidable that within the European currency union 
the fiscal crisis escalated to an international currency crisis. 
The national budget deficits increased the risk of shortfalls 
in the payment of government bonds, which were given out 
to finance the rescue packages. This increased risk in turn 
caused the degradation of the credit rating of debtor coun-
tries by rating agencies, even though they tried to trivialize 
this downgrade as an expression of opinion – they do not 
want to be liable for the consequences of their actions, that 
could prove to be too expensive. Nevertheless the most im-
portant players on the financial markets took these opinions 
seriously and as a signal to speculate against the downrated 
countries; they had, after all, all the liberties and instruments 
they needed. That they hurt the single currency in the interna-
tional competition didn’t bother them and there was nobody 
who could call them to order. Furthermore, since the end of 
the Bretton Woods system in 1973, they had learned that 
speculations were all the more profitable the more volatile the 
ups and downs of stocks and interests are. The fiscal crisis of 
individual states in the Eurozone has grown into a euro crisis 
in the global currency competition. 
The mortgage crisis, which at first only seemed to affect pri-
vate small-scale debtors, has transformed into a banking cri-
sis (of the most important institutions in the financial sector), 
which in turn transformed into a national fiscal crisis, and that 
caused an international currency crisis. The next stage of this 
crisis could be an international hegemony crisis, which may 
come when a dispute arises about which of the currencies 
will become the worldwide currency of the future, the trading 
and reserve currency, the currency for financial transactions 
and most of all the currency for the lifeblood of the industrial 
and postindustrial age – oil. Will this remain to be the US dol-
lar or will it have to resign its throne? Will the history of the 
great depression 1929 repeat itself, when in between 1929 
and 1944 (when the dollar currency system was established) 
the then-hegemonic British pound sterling was dethroned by 
the US dollar as international currency?
Which currency will follow today? The euro, the yuan, multi-
ple regional currencies or one global artificial currency? This 
question will not be answered without intense political dis-
putes. The hegemony conflicts of the 1930’s come to mind, 
the national socialist reign of terror, fascism and World War 
II – and the reminder to do everything to prevent that from 
happening again. So it’s not just about the crisis of the econ-
omy and finances; today, just as 80 years ago, it comes down 
to the question of peace in the world.
3rd argument: The imperative of public credits arises 
from the logic of a currency union: The common currency 
is not only means for the circulation of goods, it is also 
a loan.
Despite the debt brake in the Maastricht criteria – the cur-
rent deficit mustn’t exceed three percent of the GDP and 
the national debt has to be less than 60 percent of the GDP; 
a regulation that is known by every child by now – the fiscal 
crisis of the euro countries has exploded. In 2011, Greek debt 
reached 157,7 percent of the GDP, the Italian debt is at 120,3 
percent, the Irish at 112 percent, in Portugal the debt reaches 
101,7 percent of the GDP, in France 84,7 percent, in Germany 
80 percent, in Austria the debt is at 73,8 percent and in Spain 
«only» at 68,1 percent. All of that is nothing compared to the 
debt ratio of Japan, which is at 180 percent of the GDP – but 
Japan is not a member of the European currency zone, nor is 
California, where the debt ratio is just as high. 
When reading those numbers, it has to be taken into account 
who the creditors of the public funds are, who holds the gov-
ernment bonds. As long as the debt is internal, i.e. the public 
debt is financed by the citizens in the countries, the problems 
4are marginal. This is the case in Japan and the USA. If the 
debt is external though, it will be a problem, especially if the 
debt service obligations have to be met in foreign currency. 
That is exactly what happened to the debtor countries of the 
«Third World» in the 1980s: They were mostly indebted in 
dollars and thus had to raise those through export surplus 
before giving them back as debt service. Back then the IMF, 
the World Bank and the OECD governments, in cooperation 
with economists, worked out the policies of the Washington 
consensus. This resulted in a «lost decade» for the so-called 
«Third World». The experiences with the politics that were 
based on the Washington consensus presumably prompted 
the German and French governments, the EU commission 
and the ECB to include the IMF in the crisis management 
troika. The Washington consensus demands two things: an 
austerity policy on the part of the debtors to increase the bal-
ance of the primary budget (the government expenditures 
and revenue without interest), thus maintaining or restoring 
the debt service capacity, and on the part of the creditors to 
participate in crisis management by being cooperative and 
not back out of a governmentally mediated creditors’ alliance. 
The guideline is the so-called public debt sustainability. This 
could be the Maastricht criteria, but the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements determines a higher debt ceiling at 85 to 
90 percent. If the debt is calculated in foreign currency, the 
capacity limits are lower: Based on their long-term observa-
tions, Reinhart and Rogoff declare the debt capacity limit to 
be at 30 to 35 percent of the GDP, Gallagher specifies it at 
an average of 43,7 percent since the 1970s. But most euro 
countries are way above that, and a lot of Latin-American, 
African and Asian countries also have higher external debt 
in foreign currency. 
On account of the so-called independence of the ECB, the 
euro countries are indebted in their own currency, but still 
externally. The debt ceiling also depends on the interest rate 
and the refinancing options, i.e. on the size of the bond mar-
ket. Obviously, there are no objective criteria of indebtedness 
and capacity.
The budget deficits in the Eurozone (measured by the GDP) 
are higher than permitted by the Maastricht criteria, as well: 
In 2009 the deficit in Greece was at 12,7 percent, in Ireland at 
12,5 percent, in Spain at 11,2 percent and in the UK at 12,9 
percent – to give just a few examples. These numbers alarm 
the citizens in the Eurozone, and justifiably so. For the large 
financial assets, the deficits are a good thing though, because 
they are needed to profitably invest those assets. How should 
that be possible without reliable debtors? 
The homeowners and businesses have fallen away as credit 
receivers because of the crisis. Since the capacity of the 
«Third World» for investors seeking high returns is limited, 
the European public sector has the most potential as a debtor 
for the investment-seeking capital. Of course the investments 
mustn’t be too risky, and least risky are public bonds, particu-
larly if they are secured by a 440 billion rescue fund by the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The refinancing of 
the old debts and the financing of new debt is a lucrative busi-
ness, as long as the risk is delimited politically. A considerable 
part of the disputes in the Eurozone about the design of the 
securities, rescue funds and repayment schedules revolves 
around the question of organizing the public debt in a way 
that makes their financing lucrative and secure for the private 
financial institutions. Are the 440 billion enough security, or 
are more billions needed to be kept in reserve? If this question 
can be answered to the satisfaction of the financial sector, it 
won’t be impossible in 2012 to collect 47,8 billion euro for 
Greece, 143,3 for Spain, 317,6 for Italy and 217,5 for France 
to refinance their debts.
If firstly the financial institutions can borrow money from the 
ECB with low interest, secondly the risk will be delimited by 
the EFSF, thirdly the rating agencies devaluate the creditwor-
thiness of the debtor countries, so that high risk premiums 
up to several hundred basis points (for countries like Greece 
the premiums were temporarily up to 1000 basis points) can 
be demanded, and if fourthly the internal and external po-
litical pressure suffices to force an austerity policy upon the 
respective country, the quadrature of the credit circle has 
succeeded as to the collusion between private investors and 
public authority aimed at the plundering of the citizens. The 
private financial institutions can make good money, because 
they function, as per the Treaty of Maastricht, as intermediary 
when the European countries take money from one pocket 
(the ECB) to put it in the other (the budgets of the debtor 
nations). The bank always wins. A similar collusion exists 
for the credit allocation for «Third World» countries: The pri-
vate investments are officially protected from the citizens 
and their demands by an average of 39 bilateral investment 
agreements per country.
The risk spreads between countries within one currency zone 
are the trademark of the Eurozone: After the speculative crisis 
against the European currency system in the beginning of 
the 1990s up to the introduction of the euro in 1999, the risk 
spreads were extremely high, then very low until the crisis 
began in 2008 and then began to explode again – all within 
one currency zone, which is very unusual. For Greece and 
other highly indebted countries, the interest rate differen-
tials are extremely high, at least measured by the interest 
the AAA-rated Germany has to pay on the financial markets. 
Whenever there are price (for government bonds) or interest 
rate differentials within one zone, investors (banks, owners 
of monetary assets etc.) can make use of them. When the 
differentials disappear, the speculation with them ceases, 
because there’s no possibility to do business anymore.
This is one reason the defenders of «free» markets and neo-
liberal hardliners are against Eurobonds: They would dimin-
ish the risks of government bonds within the Eurozone, thus 
contributing to the dissipation or even disappearance of risk 
premium differentials. The speculative profits would, under 
the regime of the «interest socialism» (as German neoliberals 
call it), decline significantly compared to the «free markets». 
Common Eurobonds would just contribute to the logic of 
money, and that’s the euro in the Eurozone. Today, the euro 
is the common denominator for all monetary relations in the 
currency zone. It’s also the medium with which goods and 
services are circulated. And it’s a store of value – in the Euro-
zone at almost 100 percent, in the global economy at about 
26 percent (measured by the percentage of euros of the glo-
bal foreign reserve assets). The euro works as money now but 
won’t over time. Its recoverability is not under the responsi-
bility of the instance emitting the euro – the ECB – but of the 
respective country. Eurobonds could lessen this deficiency, 
but not eliminate it, because there’s no designated institution 
to pay out euro credits. This could only be effected by a spe-
5cific bank for public financing or by the ECB, whose charter 
would have to be changed accordingly. It’s clear that this 
would take away a secure source of revenue from the private 
banks – for the collective good of the European citizens, who 
have already paid more than enough for the banks.
It would then be certainly necessary to align the economy 
policies of the Eurozone member states. Eurobonds also ne-
cessitate the equalization of fiscal and economy policies and 
of the development of labor costs. This would necessarily 
require increasing the wages in Germany today to stabilize 
the commercial balances in the Eurozone. The economically 
sensible and necessary wage increase in a surplus country 
like Germany will only be possible with stronger labor unions. 
Therefore the political conditions for union action have to be 
equalized, at least by introducing minimum wages to prevent 
low and poverty wages in a highly productive and thus highly 
competitive country. 
But this can only be achieved by working against the domi-
nant economic policy, which follows the rules of austerity 
and is trying to organize the necessary equalization of the 
economic policies as an authoritarian event. The much re-
quested European economic government would be an easy 
method to collect the remaining rights of democratic partici-
pation. The alignment and thus centralization of the economic 
decisions and measures necessitates a strengthening of the 
democratic and social movements. The economic centraliza-
tion in Europe needs economic-democratic, cooperative and 
solidary counterbalances. 
4th argument: The German debt brake intensifies the fi-
nancial crisis.
As mentioned before, the Maastricht criteria demand a debt 
ceiling for public finances, which already is a debt brake. The 
difference of the «German debt brake» is that it distinguishes 
between a secondary budget, which contains all debt service 
payments, and a primary budget containing all other items. 
The nations surrounded by liberalized financial markets give 
the debt service top priority to avoid being cut off from the 
international capital markets. The secondary budget thus be-
comes sacrosanct, so that the expenses of the primary budg-
et, i.e. the transfer payments of the social sector, the staff 
expenses in the public sector or the public investments are, 
if worse comes to worst, slashed to free funds for the debt 
service in the secondary budget. In the Eurozone, the primary 
balance of all the state’s revenues and expenses is structurally 
positive. But when the debt service of the secondary budget 
is included, the high deficits materialize, calling the advocates 
for a debt brake of the primary budget into action.
They all have the goal to reduce the debt. The rules of this 
setup result in a highly unequal distribution of winnings and 
losses between the countries involved and between the re-
cipients of wages on the one hand and the recipients of in-
vestment returns on the other. A transfer of funds from the 
primary to the secondary budget always means a transfer 
from the «real economy» to the financial sector, thus adding 
to the financialisation of the finance-driven capitalism. 
5th argument: Austerity measures put the burden of manag-
ing the crisis solely on the debtors, not on the creditors.
The foul game has a name – austerity. The rules of this game 
demand of the players to implement a «catalog of atrocities». 
This game was invented during the debt crisis of the «Third 
World» in the 1980s and the IMF was probably brought to 
Europe during the euro crisis in 2009 in order to benefit from 
its expertise in austerity measures. It should be kept in mind 
though that the UK and Italy, after the end of the Bretton 
Woods system in the 1970s, were the first that had to endure 
austerity measures to save the lira and the pound sterling 
from uncontrolled devaluation. In Italy the austerity policy 
was called «la stangata», meaning «catastrophic blow». The 
beating continues today, with layoffs in the public sector, the 
cutting of wages and weakening of unions, the reduction of 
the retirement pensions and raising of the retirement age 
(«pension at 67» for all Europeans), the radical reduction of 
public investments, the raising of consumer taxes, the in-
crease in «labor market flexibility» and an extension of work-
ing hours that is supposed to weaken the unions and reverse 
the moderate social progress of the past decades. In addition, 
national wealth (i.e. public and collective assets) is privatized 
in the course of debt-for-equity transactions. 
In many European countries feelings of resignation, uncer-
tainty and desperation arise. The political class in the Euro-
zone and in the EU in general submissively follows the signals 
of the financial markets and declares them to be guides to 
progress. It is deaf to the anger and outrage of the people 
and responds to the «indignados», the indignant people, 
with ignorance and repression. The Neoliberals comply with 
Margret Thatcher’s opinion that there is no society, only indi-
viduals who exchange labor and goods on the market. Since 
socializing organizations, such as unions, are ignored and 
restrained and those without or with a low income count 
for nothing on the market, there’s nothing else to do for the 
individuals than to revolt and devise new imaginative ways 
to organize over the Internet in the process. The Neoliberals 
react to the revolting «indignados» in an authoritarian way 
and with the full force of the state – not only in the Arabic 
countries, but also in Europe.
For owners of monetary assets, equity owners and the class-
es that support them still act according to the invitation of the 
pre-revolutionary French physiocrats: «Enrichissez-vous», en-
rich yourselves. The Neoliberals have raised it to an economic 
principle and the financial operators have refined it for their 
personal gain. The robbing of those living off their work by 
those possessing assets is continued in the crisis with help 
of the austerity policy. According to the political class, the 
financial markets are to be stabilized, but their austerity policy 
is an effective means to deepen the social divide, destabilize 
politics, demolish democracy and prepare the ground for all 
sorts of populisms and phobias. After years of austerity, Eu-
rope is not only in a financial and economic crisis, but in a 
deep crisis of politics, the cultural value of social justice and 
of democracy. Democratic resistance against the austerity 
is essential. The time for outrage2 has come. The shameless 
enrichment at the expense of the poor has to stop.
5th argument part 2: The extensive government aids for 
the benefit of private capital interests undermine the 
dominant ideology of economic constraints.
Capitalism is in a deep ideological crisis. The huge govern-
ment aids for the benefit of private capital interests embarrass 
2 «Time for Outrage!» is the English translation of the bestselling treatise «Indignez-vous!» 
by French diplomat Stéphane Hessel.
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the state is not at the mercy of economic constraints, but a 
powerful actor that is asked for assistance by the financial 
institutions. This ideological crisis promotes resistance. 
The EU treaties actually prohibit the rescuing of bankrupt EU 
states by other EU states or the ECB. Both rules are violated 
at the moment, because otherwise the so-called donor states 
would need to directly handle the banks, either by helping 
them or by nationalizing them. The ideological damage prob-
ably seemed lesser when helping them indirectly by aiding 
EU states in the violation of the EU treaties.
6th argument: It’s not possible to «grow out of debt», 
the «green limited growth» is an illusion in a capitalist 
system. 
There seems to be an elegant solution to the fiscal crisis be-
yond austerity: sustainable, «green» growth by which the 
debt can be amortized little by little from a growing GDP. The 
higher the growth rate, the faster it will be. That has also been 
the recipe of the Bretton Woods institutions for the «Third 
World» countries in the 1980s. They were supposed to «grow 
out of debt». That didn’t work then, but some hope it can be 
a formula for success today, particularly with a green flair, 
considering the growth-inducing investments mainly go to 
the ecological sector. Following Roosevelt’s policy against 
the Great Depression, an ecologically oriented investment 
and growth program is called a «Green New Deal».
However, in a capitalist economy and society, even «green» 
investments have to be profitable. Without profit there’s no 
investment incentive. Thus even green businesses will try to 
cut labor costs, raise labor productivity and intensity, expand 
working hours and reduce wages. Like all other businesses, 
they strive for superior competitiveness in Europe and glo-
bally. They squeeze the less successful businesses out of the 
market and contribute to the overproduction – particularly 
when the spending capacity of the masses is reduced on ac-
count of the austerity measures and is thus insufficient even 
for green growth. This attempt to overcome the crisis leads 
into another, which announces itself on the global markets in 
terms of «imbalances» between the major economic power 
and currency blocks – USA, Europe, China, but also Brazil, 
Russia, India and others – and in the Eurozone of imbalances 
between surplus and deficit countries. Because the financing 
of deficits is linked to the development of debt positions, but 
the surpluses can be used as financial assets, the financial 
tensions are heightened, culminating in financial, debt and 
currency crises. 
And not only that: The crisis is also expanded to other as-
pects than the purely economic. Even sustainable growth 
consumes natural resources. At the limits of the availabil-
ity of resources and the capacity of pollution sinks, growth 
reaches its limit as well. This is common knowledge since 
the publications of the Club of Rome in the 1970s. Or could 
the limits be expanded, too? That is certainly imaginable. But 
even expanded limits remain limits that cannot be ignored. 
The fuel supply is limited because of the so-called peak oil 
(the maximum rate of global petroleum extraction) but it may 
grow if regenerative fuels made of biomass are used – which 
intensifies the competition for land usage. The sustainable 
growth relating to the supply of cars with fuel limits the usage 
of land for food production. Instead of peak oil, there will now 
be a «peak soil». «Biomass for the gas tank or the plate?» is 
the new question in the discourse about delimited growth. 
The manner in which the crisis is overcome inevitably results 
in a food crisis, in poor countries even in a hunger crisis. 
Though the limits of fossil fuels are expanded by the change 
to electric mobility, we still need rare metals and minerals 
for engines, batteries and transformers and will thus quickly 
reach a physical limit, a limit of national energy security and 
exclusionary limits formed by increased prices, limits of sup-
ply. Limits everywhere. The idea of expanding limits as a so-
lution for the delimited growth is a rather narrow-minded 
concept, even though it presents itself as «green».
Unionists argue that the growth could be immaterial or vir-
tual, thus avoiding the disadvantages of green delimited 
growth. But what is growth without the usage of materials 
and energy, which are after all limited? Growth without utiliza-
tion value is purely a growth of prices, in other words inflation. 
Inflation could contribute to the partial destruction of assets 
and implicitly to the depreciation of debts. But the deprecia-
tion ought to be carried out by a debt cut, not by inflation, 
which would dispossess everybody depending on the stable 
value of monetary claims, including pensioners, recipients of 
transfer payments and private savers.
7th argument: The transition to a degrowth and non-profit 
economy is possible.
Wouldn’t it be possible to see to it that instead of the material 
production the immaterial public services are expanded for 
ecological and social reasons? Aren’t there a lot of invest-
ment opportunities in public health and education, in the care 
for children and seniors, in solidarity and civic work, in the 
mediation of conflicts or in community work? Indeed there 
are, but then this competence-requiring sectors would have 
to be organized and extended as public non-profit activities. 
They cannot be operated in a capitalist and profitable way, 
unless they are subsidized by means of tax revenues that 
are diverted from the growth. The degrowth of the economy, 
though propagated by the critics of the growth system, is 
not enough, what would be needed is an expansion of the 
non-profit sector. So the alternative to austerity and growth 
is a transitioning to post-capitalism. The questioning of the 
whole system is inevitable.
8th argument: A debt cut is unavoidable. The crisis could 
be defused by fair and transparent insolvency proceedings.
If it is impossible to grow out of debt and the horrors of auster-
ity cause Europe-wide outrage and drive millions of people in 
Athens and Madrid, in Reykjavik and London to the streets, 
the only solution to the crisis is a radical debt relief for the 
overwhelmed debtor countries. It is paradoxical: Although 
the crisis is perceived as a financial crisis, the solutions al-
ways focus on the debtors first, not the creditors, though 
they are an integral part and player in the financial relations. 
In fact the crisis management measures inevitably result in a 
relief for the creditors while burdening the debtors with the 
costs of the structural adjustment. The solution to a financial 
crisis is always expected to be achieved by asymmetrically 
reestablishing the debtor’s debt service capacity. To this end 
austerity was invented. The fact that creditors are part of a 
financial crisis and have to contribute to the overcoming is 
not taken into account.
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ital, bear the risk of the investment and are liable for losses. 
Financial investors, however, take on a special role, because 
in capitalist societies, as Karl Marx already knew, money is 
itself the community, so creditors pervert the motto of the «in-
dignados»: «We financial investors won’t pay for our crisis». 
For them, the term «money» only refers to their assets, not 
to the logical counter-entry of the debt of others. Money has 
to be recognized as a social relation to get over the fetishism 
that money is equivalent to claims, but not to the obligations 
without which the claims would be worthless.
If the debt is reduced, obeying the German demand of a debt 
brake in the European financial crisis, assets and funds also 
have to be reduced. Nobody can reject this logic of money, 
not even by referring to the holy right of property. That’s why 
even bankers and other owners of monetary assets agree to 
a «haircut»; they at least suspect that their claims are worth-
less if the debtors are insolvent. The «haircut» has so far been 
as nice, harm- and painless as the word sounds: On closer 
examination, the cancelation of the Greek debt is purely cos-
metic, a big bluff. The claims that the banks are surrendering 
in the case of Greece in 2011 will be exchanged for EFSF 
papers – not in full, but still favorably and profitably, since 
those papers provide more security and higher interest rates. 
Insolvency proceedings could involve the creditors, if they are 
fair and transparent. The liberalization of the global financial 
markets brought forth all sorts of financial innovations, pro-
vided they are helpful to the expansion of the financial mar-
kets and the interest yield of financial investors. Among these 
innovations are the ludicrous securities, which were allowed 
to originate with official blessing, the speculative funds, the 
tax and financial havens, in which a powerful demimonde of 
financial criminals yielding profits with money laundering and 
tax evasion has formed, the rating agencies, without whose – 
officially recognized – placet the securities would have been 
worthless from the beginning. The financial market system is 
designed to expand economic limits, without consideration 
for nature or society, forming bubbles that are bound to burst 
at some point. 
In the crisis though, the lack of regulation becomes evident. 
There is no statutory proceeding concerning the creditor’s 
participation in the losses of a failed credit relationship. The 
debtors have to pay until they are bankrupt. But the states 
with their institutional systems, their territories and popula-
tion, their legal duties and their power neither disappear from 
the map, nor can they be deleted from some register. The 
USA’s extremely high debt does not immediately result in 
the corrosion of their nuclear arsenal or the unavailability of 
killer drones and they can still afford a larger military budget 
than the rest of the world, including Russia and China, com-
bined. Even the UK, which was deindustrialized by neoliberal 
policies, still has considerable military power which they are 
ready to employ for their own interests. The war against Libya 
has been a lucrative business for the defense business and, 
most of all, the oil industry.
In principle nothing has changed since the days when debt-
ors were thrown into pauper’s prisons. If the debtor countries 
are weak in a military or political sense, they have to pay, and 
if they can’t, so-called swap methods are devised, like a lot 
of times before: debt for land swaps (that’s how the USA 
acquired part of the Mexican territory, which formerly ranged 
up to Oregon), debt for equity swaps, meaning debt for as-
sets in the course of privatizations, debt for nature, like the 
proposition of swapping the Greek debt for the Greek isles 
and beaches.
Though there’s no formal insolvency regime, the debt relief 
mustn’t be reduced to a swapping of monetary and real as-
sets that lets the creditors get away without write-offs while 
making the debtors carry the whole weight of the debt relief 
and dispossessing them after the austerity. That’s another 
asymmetrical concept: The expansion of the financial markets 
virtually self-regulates when business is good and the legal 
regulations emerge almost spontaneously from the econom-
ic relations and the private interest for high and secure returns 
that controls them. In contrast, the contraction of financial 
relations with sovereign investment occurs mostly irregular 
and ad hoc, most of the time meaning a nationalizing of the 
losses to save the private gains. The losses are paid by the 
taxpayers in the debtor and debtee countries. Goldmann & 
Sachs pay next to nothing in taxes, while the average income 
tax is at 41,1 percent in France and 39,2 percent in Germany. 
Therefore rules have to be established to reduce debts and 
assets symmetrically considering the criteria of fairness. Not 
only the debt, but also the financial assets have to shrink. The 
hypertrophic financial sector has to be minimized.
9th argument: The taxation of assets and high incomes is 
indispensable, not only for reasons of social justice, but 
to overcome the financial crisis.
In the last two or three decades, enormous monetary assets 
were accumulated, because the taxes on assets and high 
incomes were tremendously reduced. To prevent new accu-
mulation of assets and for reasons of tax equity, those taxes 
have to be raised again. It is imperative to correct another 
asymmetry: Although there are European rules for the cap-
ping of the fiscal deficit on the expenditure side, there are no 
European standards for the state revenues, in particular taxes. 
This results in a tax competition which has the fatal effect of 
reducing taxation bases and rates and of liberalizing tax col-
lection regulations, so that the tax burden for high assets and 
incomes is declining. In the last two decades, the corporate 
income tax was lowered all over the EU: In Germany from 
50 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2009, in Greece from 46 
percent to 25 percent, in France from 37 to 33,3 percent, in 
Ireland to only 12,5 percent, and so on (EuroMemo 2010/11). 
In the face of the deplored investment crisis, these fortunes 
were used speculatively, thus destabilizing the financial mar-
kets. To prevent that, a capital levy and a tax on financial 
transactions are necessary. For the latter, a majority could be 
obtained at European level by now, provided that the social 
movements for a fair taxation continue their work and exert 
political pressure.
10th argument: The incompetence of the economic sci-
ences’ mainstream makes an «economic alphabetiza-
tion» today more necessary than ever. 
The lack of debate about solutions for the crisis and ways to 
overcome it can be explained with the prevailing knowledge 
of economics, which is trapped in paradigms of practical con-
straints and lack of alternatives. Walter Benjamin interpreted 
capitalism as being a religion. The economists behave like 
high priests of a religion and contribute to the sanctification of 
8the capitalist constructs of power and reproduction as some-
thing holy and unchangeable. Their fetishism is not only false 
consciousness, the deluded scientist’s mark of Cain, but also 
a premise for the practice to sell technical analysis as divine 
conclusions. That’s advantageous for the political decision 
makers and it raises the valuable reputation of the origina-
tors. Some economists are bribable and allow their clients 
to use their concoctions for propaganda purposes, though 
they sometimes disavow themselves in the process, like the 
US economics advisor who attested Iceland highest financial 
stability, just as the three biggest banks of the country were 
going bankrupt.
Economic science is part of the machine that brought the 
financial markets to full speed and keeps it running even in 
the crisis. The theory of rational expectations, the belief in 
the beneficial effect of free markets in general and the ef-
ficiency of the financial markets in particular, the rejection 
of social adjustments of the market development and the 
belief that free trade benefits all trading partners are some of 
the fundamentalisms that were internalized by the political 
class, polished in academic research and spread in teaching 
world-wide, with only few exceptions. Many mechanisms 
cater to these economic fundamentalisms, as for example the 
awarding of the so-called Nobel prizes in economics, apart 
from a few exceptions.
Alternative economic science exists, as do alternative econo-
mists, who follow the theories of Immanuel Wallerstein and 
try to «unthink» the social and economic sciences to over-
come mental barriers. Heterodox Keynesians also try to hold 
their ground against the «religious» mainstream, even though 
they are persecuted as «separatists» by the market funda-
mentalists and lost their jobs and influence at a lot of German 
universities. A «post-autistic» economy has arisen and has 
developed international networks, but hasn’t so far been able 
to take root in the world of academics. Marxism is tedious, 
rare, marginal and has little influence on academic activities. 
It is crucial to not surrender the search for solutions to the cri-
sis of the financial markets, of the economy, but also of nature 
and politics to the fundamentalists. During the French revo-
lution, the people aggressively and educationally shouted 
«Écrasez l’infame» («Crush the infamy») at the institutional-
ized guardians over Christianity. Today it’s about something 
similar. Progress at overcoming the crisis can only be made 
against the economic religion, against the neoliberal funda-
mentalists with their academically doubtful doctrines that 
deify capitalism. Conceptions to overcome the crisis mustn’t 
omit the science or the ideologies. A solution to the crisis can 
only be found if the economic mainstream is «unthought». 
This also means to negate the hegemonic history of the crisis 
that is propagated by the media and the political mainstream, 
who tell the tale of more or less independent crises in Greece, 
Ireland, Spain and elsewhere that were supposedly caused 
by laziness, corruption and the proliferation of the welfare 
state. This myth is spread to stimulate and escalate conflicts 
between the citizens of different countries and to conceal 
the true distributional conflict behind the crisis: the conflict 
between the entire European society on one side and the 
banks, the corporations and the rich on the other. As long as 
this line of conflict is obscured, the ruling class can use the 
crisis to propagate the rapid redistribution of wealth from the 
bottom to the top as the only possibility.
Hence the intensification of the solidary, joint work of social 
actors all over Europe is necessary. The political stage on 
which this conflict is carried out is Europe. A strong European 
social forum is needed more than ever. The resistant activities 
are still mostly focused on the political stage of the respective 
nations, although the governments of the most heavily affect-
ed countries have already been disempowered. The puppet 
masters of the so-called crisis policy can mostly be found in 
the headquarters of the big banking houses, in the European 
commission, in the European Central Bank, in the IMF and 
in the treasury departments of the credit-granting countries, 
in particular Germany and France. The European grassroots 
movement has to put pressure on these players – not only 
in Madrid or Athens, but also in Berlin, Paris and Brussels to 
be a thorn in the flesh of the power-accumulating oligarchs 
and plutocrats.
nOte
The scientific advisory board of Attac was founded in 2001 
and is an association of more than 100 professors, scientists 
and experts, representing a broad spectrum of different dis-
ciplines. The economists, sociologists, political scientists, ju-
rists, psychologists and experts from other professions intend 
to allocate their expertise to the anti-globalization network 
Attac Germany. The members of the scientific advisory board 
generally agree upon their critical perception of the current 
course of globalization. This doesn’t exclude pluralism in the 
methods, goals and conclusions or differing positions. The 
scientific advisory board does not consider itself part of the 
anti-globalization network Attac Germany, but an independ-
ent panel with own assessments and opinions. 
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